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Introduction[1] 
Sparked at least partially by suggestions that technological advances have created an age of 
civilization in which information will play a dominant role in forms of human societal organizing[2] 
and enabled through advances in network analysis[3], some of the more interesting literature to 
emerge recently on conflict has recognized and explored the role of networks.[4] In this work, it is 
argued that the evolving information age empowers networks as an organizational form[6] that 
can execute collective actions. Networks can thus emerge as system-challenging actors in the 
context of contemporary conflict.  
In simple terms, social movements can be described as individuals, groups, and organizations 
connected via internal and external networks that challenge the system in which they are 
situated—usually within the context of political governance and/or societal organizing. In short, 
social movements represent an amalgamation of loosely or tightly coupled networks of system-
challenging actors. Similarly, diaspora communities are sometimes described as individuals, 
groups, and organizations linked through tightly or loosely coupled networks and bonded via 
language, shared history, ritual, collective norms, and similar cultural artifacts. Thus, social 
movements can be described as system-challenging networks, and diasporas can be described 
as networks that, among a host of other activities, sometimes execute system-challenging 
behavior. Leveraging social movement theory (SMT) to explore the phenomenon of diasporic 
collective contentious action, then, seems to make intuitive sense. Specifically, synthesizing SMT 
with emerging research on Muslim diaspora communities in Europe is interesting due to growing 
evidence that European communities have been unable (or perhaps unwilling) to sufficiently 
respond to expectations of its Muslim citizens and immigrants, specifically as related to 
widespread acceptance of Islamic societal institutions.  
This paper makes two claims. First, it suggests that through such a synthesis, studying system-
challenging behavior by Muslim diaspora communities within Europe reveals that five other types 
of collective actions are often coincident with system-challenging actions: 1) disassociation, 2) 
withdrawal, 3) linkage, 4) co-option, and 5) creation of parallel structures, which can be 
interpreted as a hybridization of the other actions. Second, this paper suggests that such displays 
of collective contentious behavior may, under certain conditions, indicate the emergence of a 
pan-ethnic Islamic identity. In turn, this pan-ethnic Islamic identity affects how Muslim diaspora 
communities in Europe interact with host institutions, changing the scope, focus, and expected 
outcomes of this interaction.  
Diaspora  
Discussion of issues such as social movements and diaspora is complicated from the outset due 
to the lack of consensus on definitions and ideal types. In particular, that which constitutes a 
diaspora is hotly debated.[6] Further, while McAdam et al’s synthesis of political opportunity, 
framing processes, and mobilizing structures is offered as a unifying framework through which 
social movements can be studied,[7] much is still unknown about these highly dynamic and 
interactive phenomena. This paper is based on an understanding of social movements as a 
series of contentious collective actions of an overtly political nature by individuals, groups, and 
organizations seeking or repelling some type of reform within a system of political governance, as 
well as the structure, agency, and interactions that enable these actions to occur.[8] In other 
words, social movements consist of a series of events in which system-challenging actors, 
bystanders, and authority figures interact in order to institute or repel some type of political or 
societal change.  
Prior to 1990, the study of diaspora communities was dominated by the examination of forced 
migration of Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Africans,[9] with sporadic exceptions to include the 
study of uprooted Palestinians[10] as well as Puerto Ricans emigrating to the United States[11]. 
In the past fift een years, however, inquiry into diaspora communities has exploded, perhaps out 
of recognition that the concerns of diasporic networks have become increasingly prominent in the 
unfolding of national and international politics[12] or simply out of recognition that diasporic 
terminology applies beyond the narrow context of ethnic Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Africans, and 
Puerto Ricans. As early as 1995, scholars began to discuss the possibility of whether a Muslim 
diaspora existed within Europe,[13] while other scholars attempted to establish broad-based 
typologies of diaspora communities.[14]  
Who are the Muslim diaspora within Europe? As consensus on the term diaspora community has 
yet to be reached, an attempt to bound diaspora analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Clearly, however, researchers have begun to study these communities, sometimes bounding the 
analysis through ethnicity, sometimes through the borders or enclaves of the adopted country, 
sometimes through religious sect, or sometimes all three. Examples include ethnographic study 
of ethnic Turks in Germany[15] and Bulgaria,[16] ethnic Pakistanis in the United Kingdom,[17] 
ethnic Maghrebi in France;[18] and journalistic, comparative inquiry into Muslims in various 
European countries.[19] Other research has focused on hypothesis testing of dominant theories 
regarding the meaning of citizenship in an increasingly globalized society,[20] comparative study 
of assimilation and integration of Muslim minorities to historical parallels,[21] exploring the range 
of host nation attitudes toward Muslim immigrants,[22] Islam’s role in building community and 
collective identity,[23] diffusion of Islamic thinking and interpretation between Europe, North 
America, the Middle East and South Asia through the writings of Islamic scholars,[24] and 
differences in integration of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands from juridical and socioeconomic 
perspectives.[25] From this body of work, it seems clear that the Islamic diaspora in Europe is 
diverse, growing, and replete with issues and concerns affecting any other cross-sectional slice of 
contemporary society, such as inter-generational conflict, ensuring physical and financial security, 
and interpreting appropriate individual actions within the context of a moral life.  
SMT: A Context For Studying Diaspora  
Given the conflicting, evolutionary nature of social movement theory and the loosely-worded 
terminology of diaspora studies, why try to synthesize them? First and foremost, by straddling 
micro (such as individuals and their recruitment into social movement organizations) and macro 
(such as state interaction with multiple cooperative and competitive social movement 
organizations) levels of analysis, social movement research offers the potential of investigation at 
a mesolevel of analysis[26]—i.e., a level residing between small group dynamics and movement 
historiography. Such a level of analysis offers insight into inter-group decision-making and 
behaviors, which in Gerhards and Rucht’s analysis of mesomobilization,[28] translates into pan-
group mobilizing and organizing. A cursory review of diaspora communities, particularly diaspora 
communities from predominantly Muslim countries located within Europe, reveals that many such 
communities include networks of individual, group, and organizational actors; studying them at 
the mesolevel of analysis, then, seems intuitively fruitful to describing, explaining, and 
understanding the dynamics of diaspora-host contention.  
Second, social movement theory offers insights grounded in explorations of human collective 
behavior that for the most part, is goal-oriented, seeking to address a grievance that may be 
clearly articulated or shrouded in more generalized rhetoric and discourse. In interactions with 
host institutions, many diaspora communities demonstrate goal-oriented action that is indicative 
of a greater social concern. For example, creation of kindergartens more closely aligned with 
Islam in Germany[28] offers an indication that German society—at a macro level—is not adapting 
or responding to the Islamic mores of some diaspora communities within its borders. Thus the 
intersection of the two fields of research promise to inform each other, and perhaps a synergy 
created through their synthesis will yield new, innovative, and interesting interpretations of sub-
state and trans-state conflict.  
What, then, emerges through a review of available research on Muslim diaspora communities in 
Europe through a SMT lens? Offering these thoughts merely in the context of an initial study, I 
suggest that three observations are particularly interesting: evidence of co-incident behaviors 
executed in tandem with system-challenging behaviors, the rise of parallel institutions, and 
instances of organizing and mobilizing based on a pan-ethnic Islamic identity.  
Co-incident Behaviors & Parallel Institutions  
Descriptions of diaspora community behavior, considered as a collective set of group actions, 
indicate that in addition to system-challenging actions, diaspora communities’ interactions with 
host-country institutions can be placed into five general categories:  
1. Disengagement or disassociation;  
2. Withdrawal;  
3. Linkage;  
4. Co-option; and  
5. Creation of parallel institutions.  
Disengagement or disassociation refers to a lack of interaction that is neither purposively evasive 
nor consciously considered; it likely stems from subtleties, opportunities and norms existing within 
the environment that result in conditioned behavior toward choosing, for example, this store over 
another or toward pursuing this friendship and not that one. In a sense, norms of disengagement 
could both pre-exist in the environment and then perpetuate through normative adherence. 
Although pin-pointing a single cause for disengagement would prove unlikely, reasonable 
explanations would include a lack of integration between host and diaspora communities, lack of 
acceptance of diaspora members and norms within the host country (such as demonstrations of 
explicit and implicit racism), and lack of opportunities for integration and acceptance to occur. 
One could also expect that gains made in understanding in/out-group dynamics would prove 
relevant to exploring this phenomenon of disengagement.  
In contrast, withdrawal consists of a lack of interaction between the diaspora community and host 
institutions that is purposefully or consciously evasive following some period when interaction did 
occur. Withdrawal represents behavior that can exist only if the diaspora communities and 
institutions of the host country were once linked, either permanently or temporarily, through 
deliberate or random meetings. Like disengagement, withdrawal could result from any number of 
reasons, from failures to meet expectations to inadequacies in the services provided by the 
linkage to normative conditioning.  
Linkage consists of attempts of diaspora communities to link to existing host-country institutions—
such as actions to initiate discourse between disparate host and diasporic groups, request 
assistance or rightful benefits from local government, or encourage information or resource-
sharing with or from institutions within the host country. In his discussion of linkages between 
Christian and Muslim groups in Germany, Jonken describes that frustrations emerged out of 
differing expectations for such linkages; in many cases, Christian groups viewed the interactions 
as opportunities for education and dialogue, while participating Muslim groups and/or individuals 
expected concrete assistance to result. Attempts at linkage, then, are likely dependent upon the 
level of overlap between expectations and outcomes by the participating host institutions and 
diasporic groups.  
Co-option occurs when a diaspora community is able to leverage host institutions in such a 
manner that the institutions can (and do) adequately represent and lobby for diaspora community 
concerns. Examples might include the use of state funds for schools administered by religious 
groups, use of the courts and other artifacts of the legal system to force employers to honor times 
or days of worship or coverage of diaspora issues by host-country media. Challenge, on the other 
hand, represents interactions in which a diaspora community or its representatives openly 
confront a host institution about any variety of issues, such as discrimination, cultural insensitivity, 
inadequacy of services, poor policy, poor implementation of policy, and similar items. Examples 
might include worker strikes or non-violent protest and most closely align with what would be 
traditionally considered as system-challenging actions.  
Finally, creation of parallel institutions refers to diaspora action in which structures such as 
schools, houses of worship, banking relationships, and so on, are eschewed in favor of 
institutions performing similar functions indigenous to the diaspora community. Such phenomena 
perhaps represents a hybridization of withdrawal and challenge, as the diaspora community 
withdraws from host institutions due to inadequacy in meeting their needs, then creates structures 
that form a de facto challenge to such institutions through replication of their functions.[29] In a 
sense, the creation of parallel institutions establishes distinct community structures that co-exist 
within the same geographic space, but do not generally interact with regularity. Residents of the 
“home” country are served by existing institutions. However, members of diaspora communities 
might be served by alternate institutions that are more accommodating to their needs.  
Islamic Identity  
A significant portion of the literature related to diaspora communities from predominantly Muslim 
countries situated within Europe focuses on identity and its various substrata: personal identity, 
group identity, national identity, ethnic identity, cultural identity, and so on. Leveau suggests that 
Islam represents an important collective behavior (and one would add, belief structure) among 
migrants to Europe since the 1970s, while Cameron suggests that among young Muslims in 
Europe, identification with Islam may be felt more strongly than identification with a particular 
ethnic heritage.[30] The emergence of a strong Islamic identity among Muslims in Europe, 
particularly an Islamic identity that is independent of affiliation with a particular ethnic group, leads 
to interesting possibilities for pan-ethnic, and perhaps even pan-sect, mobilizing and organizing. 
The desire to live in accordance with Islamic principles may emerge as a central, unifying 
commonality among the participants. In such environments, Islamic activism becomes possible. 
Under certain conditions, then, civic-minded organizations and social clubs may no longer need 
to be centered on ethnic lines within a geographic enclave, such as Pakistanis in Manchester or 
Turks in Munich, but may instead organize, recruit, and mobilize along religious, pan-ethnic 
commonalities. In this scenario, Islam, not ethnicity, becomes a unifying force through which 
collective action is forged.  
Indeed, Mandaville and Werbner suggest that pan-ethnic Muslim identity is part of the fabric of 
Muslim diaspora life within Europe[ 31]. In her study of ethnic Pakistani Muslims in Great Britain, 
Werbner contends that while British Pakistanis remain committed to issues in Pakistan: 
…at the same time [British] Pakistanis have also redefined themselves as a Muslim 
diaspora….To invest a Muslim diaspora against the grain has entailed for British Pakistanis a 
refocusing on the Islamic peripheries—on minority Muslim communities, often persecuted and 
displaced, beyond the Islamic heartland. Hence, Pakistanis in Britain have rediscovered their 
connection to Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir. In their fund-raising efforts they work with 
major Muslim transnational non-governmental organisations… Being a Muslim diasporan does 
not entail an imperative of physical return to a lost homeland. It enables Pakistanis to foster and 
yet defer indefinitely the fulfillment of the myth of their return back home, while asserting their 
present responsibility for fellow diasporan Muslims—their membership is a transnational moral 
religious community, the umma. The Muslim diaspora opens up a diasporic space of critical 
dissent against leaders everywhere: the Arab world, Pakistan, and the West…[32]  
In short, collective identity, at least for Pakistani Muslims, exists not only in the form of a Pakistani 
heritage, ties, and cultural traditions, but also as members of a broader community of Muslims 
across the globe, with particular emphasis placed on supporting marginalized Muslims. Similarly, 
Mandaville suggests that Muslim youth growing up in Europe may feel more affinity toward the 
Palestinian cause than their migrant parents. From a social movement perspective, we should 
expect that pan-ethnic organizing and mobilizing is entirely possible—and perhaps to be 
expected—among Muslim diaspora communities when the grievance is associated with a 
marginalized Muslim group outside the “home” country. In other words, we should expect that the 
grievance leading to mobilization will not necessarily be one to which those mobilizing are 
connected via familial or ethnic obligation or linkage, but rather that such mobilizing—when 
representing an outgrowth of one’s Islamic identity—may center on issues of marginalized Muslim 
groups (or more broadly, a perception of Islam itself as marginalized) beyond either the host or 
home countries. In such cases, one’s Islamic identity could then become a central feature of 
organizing for contentious collective action. This possibility deserves greater study. 
If, indeed, a pan-ethnic Islamic identity is emerging upon Muslim diaspora groups in Europe, what 
are some of the phenomena that might be contributing to or accompanying its emergence? Four 
trends seem particularly notable in terms of their exploratory and explanatory power.  
1. Inter-generational gap 
Mandaville suggests that an intergenerational gap exists between foreign-born parents and host-
country-born youth in which Islam and its role in individual life is not only interpreted differently, 
but moreover, concerns about injustice and fairness are focused on entirely different locales, with 
parents focused on “home” and youth focused on “host.”[33] According to Mandaville, some 
European Muslim youth express disappointment that their parents know the intricacies of political 
issues in a home country, such as Pakistan, but have little interest in engaging in political issues 
in the neighborhoods in which they reside. Indeed, two factors appear critically important to 
understanding inter-generational gaps within Muslim diaspora communities: age and the location 
in which one primarily spent one’s youth. First-generation diaspora, it seems, may have closer 
ties to “home” country issues, while younger second-generation diaspora, or diaspora members 
who have spent the bulk of their youth in the “host” country, may have closer ties to local issues. 
Fewer ties to the “home” country may result in formation of identities among younger diaspora 
members that center upon the common experience of Muslim belief and practice, enabling 
greater opportunities for the emergence of pan-ethnic Islamic identity.  
2. Pride in “otherness”  
Haller suggests that within the context of identity, two “master emotions” predominate: pride and 
shame.[34] How might these master emotions play out in the context Muslim diaspora in Europe? 
Although anecdotal, White’s research highlighted a phenomenon among Turkish street gangs to 
so absorb the identity of otherness such that the derogatory term Barbaren, used by some 
Germans to denote foreigners, was turned to a source of power when it was selected as name for 
a street gang of ethnic Turkish youth. In this twist, a label of shame becomes a label of pride and 
a means of challenging a culture that is unaccepting of at least some ethnic Turk versions of 
German residency. From a social movement perspective, this transitioning of the term Barbaren 
from a source of shame to a manifestation of pride parallels similar appropriation of derogatory 
terms and symbols by other groups participating in social movements, such as the gay/lesbian 
movement’s appropriation of the Nazi-era pink triangle as its own. Barbaren may seem a 
derogatory and exclusionary term for some, but for those involved in the street gang and with 
significant likelihood, close associates of gang members, the term Barbaren now connotes power, 
inclusiveness, and acceptance—perhaps even a sense of invincibility and righteousness. In 
societies dominated by Christian religious institutions that simultaneously view Islamic life as a 
foreign “otherness,” this self v. other phenomenon could easily contribute to pan-ethnic Islamic 
identity as a mechanism for solidarity, hope, pride, and perhaps even survival. Polarization, in 
other words, may lead to development of more intense identification with Islamic mores.  
3. Forced acceptance 
Further, Mandaville contends that for some Muslim youth in Europe, lack of acceptance and 
integration leads some to reject Islam as a vestige of the past, while others embrace Islam as a 
re-affirmation of identity and heritage. Among the latter youth, some seek to demonstrate this 
identity in avowedly public and vocal ways.[35] In some respects—particularly when 
demonstrations are aimed at consciously challenging a prevailing view among non-Muslims in the 
host nation—this vocalism represents a forcing function, a forced acceptance of tolerance, dignity, 
and rights not only to exist, but to live openly and without retribution in accordance with one’s 
religion and culture. From a social movement perspective, such attitudes are critical factors in 
generating energy for mobilization; if one is not frustrated by a particular grievance of perceived 
injustice, or if one feels that societal institutions are generally meeting one’s needs, a key element 
of mobilization is lost. Individual recognition of a lack of one’s acceptance within host institutions, 
coupled with a willingness to consciously challenge this lack of acceptance, can serve as 
catalysts for the organization and mobilization that could lead to greater public outcry—both 
building and reinforcing a stronger sense of Islamic identity that transcends ethnic boundaries.  
4. Overlap 
A final aspect of identity emerges from available literature on Muslim diaspora communities in 
Europe. Specifically, despite comprehension that personal identity is often an overlapping 
(sometimes incongruous) litany of choices and associations, in many cases, one is generally not 
forced to live within the singular context of one particular identity. Different aspects of one’s 
identity, although always intrinsic to one’s self-perception, can dominate in particular situations; 
one chooses which parts of one’s identity to emphasize with others and at which times to do so. 
Sometimes the choice is reactionary, sometimes instrumental, and sometimes, a matter of 
chance events. For members of Muslim diaspora communities in Europe, the situation is no 
different —certain aspects of self-identity dominate sometimes, other aspects dominate at others. 
Thus it is entirely possible for self-identity to simultaneously include both one’s ethnic heritage 
and one’s religion, and indeed, for both relationships to present themselves simultaneously in the 
tacit and explicit expression of identity. Ethnic identity and religious identity are generally not 
dissonant; even if they were, only rarely, if ever, might an individual be forced to choose between 
them.  
Conclusion  
Understanding identity issues within Muslim diaspora communities requires levels of analysis at 
pan-ethnic, generational, in/out group, and individual levels. Further, diaspora communities may 
elect to direct support toward marginalized Muslim groups that receive less attention from 
counterparts in one’s home country, creating, in a sense, a pan-Islamic identity, or at least a 
sense of responsibility for other Muslim groups that is less likely in the “home” country. As a result, 
community identity for Muslim diaspora in Europe includes both ethnic identity through linkages to 
the “home” country and pan-ethnic identity through concern for other Muslims. Groups, including 
gangs, may form out of taking pride in “otherness,” absorbing symbols of non-acceptance and 
perhaps making collective attempts at forcing acceptance of identity. This forced acceptance of 
identity, however, also exists at the individual level, as evidenced through some Muslim youth 
articulating in outwardly demonstrable manners that they have explicitly chosen and are proud of 
their identity. For social movement researchers interested in the Islamic diaspora, understanding 
how these overlapping self-identities coincide and contribute to community or collective identities 
is a critical task.  
Further, when diaspora communities demonstrate system-challenging actions, five other types of 
behavior also are often co-incident: 1) disassociation, 2) withdrawal, 3) linkage, 4) co-option, and 
5) creation of parallel structures. Of these behaviors, creation of parallel structures is particularly 
interesting in a social movement context, as the structures represent a de facto challenge to host-
country institutions and in effect, create distinct, but parallel, communities within the same relative 
geographic space. Existence of these parallel but distinct communities may have the effect of 
reinforcing identities forged from viewing host-diasporic interactions in “self vs. other” terms. As 
such distinctions become more dominant, both individually and societally, those intending to 
integrate diaspora members into existing host-country communities may find it difficult to 
overcome trends toward separation and distinction, particularly when such trends were borne out 
of necessity or exclusion 
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